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1 Introduction
In new economic geography (NEG) models that explain firms’ and workers’ localization decisions,
consumers’/workers’ preferences are usually assumed to be homogenous and represented through
the same utility function. In particular, in many of these models there is a specific category of
workers who are interregionally mobile - usually identified as skilled workers - and a category of
interregionally immobile workers - usually identified as unskilled workers. Thanks to NEG models
we can analyze how the actual and endogenous movements of mobile workers, together with those
of firms, give rise to a certain number of centripetal and centrifugal forces, whose interplay leads
to a particular equilibrium outcome in which the economic activity is more or less agglomerated
depending on the strength of all particular forces at work. However, NEG models do not generally
consider the case in which some of these forces may be generated by workers’ preference differences,
even though there are some exceptions to which we will refer later on. In any case, we may think
that the assumption of homogenous preferences across workers has the capacity to keep things
simple in already complex frameworks.
Let us consider, for instance, the seminal core-periphery model by Krugman (1991). In this
model a change in trade cost levels, through skilled workers’ and firms’ mobility, may modify the
intensities of two agglomeration forces - described as the market access effect and the price index
effect - and the intensity of one dispersion force - the so called market-crowding effect.1 Depending
on trade cost levels, these forces will lead to a stable equilibrium of complete agglomeration of
the modern sector in one region, or to a symmetric equilibrium in which all economic activity is
evenly distributed across space. We would like to point out that skilled and unskilled workers
considered in this model have the same preferences. Moreover, changes in their interregional
distribution cannot modify the strength of forces that determine the distribution of the economic
activity, because of the assumption of the particular version of the monopolistic competition model
1 See, for instance, chapter 2 in Baldwin et al. (2003).
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developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and of iceberg trade costs.2 According to Ottaviano et al.
(2002, p. 410):
Taken together, these assumptions yield a demand system in which the own-price
elasticities of demands are constant, identical to the elasticities of substitutions, and
equal to each other across all differentiated products. This entails equilibrium prices
that are independent of the spatial distribution of firms and consumers. Though
convenient from an analytical point of view, such a result conflicts with research in
spatial pricing theory that shows that demand elasticity varies with distance while
prices change with the level of demand and the intensity of competition.
Thus, Ottaviano et al. (2002) propose a new framework in order to take into account their
objections and, in this work, we will heavily draw on their model, which we modify to show our
point.
In particular, we argue that, besides the traditional forces treated in new economic geography
models, we may consider a new kind of force generated from workers’ preference differences, whose
nature of agglomeration or dispersion force will be discussed and identified below, and whose action
contributes to the determination of equilibria stability properties. Moreover, in order to simplify
our analysis, we assume that workers’ preference differences are connected to skills differences and
we will later justify this assumption. Now we observe that a class of new economic geography
models distinguish two groups of workers, that is: interregionally immobile unskilled workers and
interregionally mobile skilled workers. Hence, we retain this distinction introducing the following
additional assumption: we associate to the difference in workers’ skill endowments and mobility
characteristics differences in their preferences, with one group of workers more willing to consume
the modern differentiated good than the traditional good and, at the same time, more keen on
having a greater variety of the differentiated good. In fact, it does not seem unrealistic to think
2 See, for instance, Ottaviano and Thisse (2003).
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that agents which have a greater love for the modern good also appreciate its differentiation more.
Moreover, at this stage of the paper, we do not have to state which of the two types of workers
has a stronger preference for the modern good and for a greater differentiation in its consumption.
Nevertheless, in many of our comments in the paper, we will refer to the case in which this type
of workers is that of mobile skilled workers, since it seems fair to assume that more skilled mobile
workers are also the ones that have a stronger preference for the consumption of the modern good
and for a greater variety in its consumption.
As mentioned before, we need to say that, even if new economic geography models generally
consider that all workers have the same structure of preferences, the papers by Tabuchi and Thisse
(2002) and by Murata (2003) are an exception to this common line. Tabuchi and Thisse (2002)
introduce taste heterogeneity by allowing different mobile workers to react in different ways to
regional differences, and they show that this heterogeneity produces a strong dispersion force.
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002, p. 156) write that, in this way, they are allowed to “show how falling
transport costs and individual heterogeneities in perceptions of regional differences interact to
affect firms’ and workers’ locations and, therefore, the geographical pattern of the industry and
population”. Also in Murata (2003) taste heterogeneity in residential location of the single type
of mobile workers acts as a dispersion force.
However, the form of heterogeneity that we introduce differs from that considered by Tabuchi
and Thisse (2002) and Murata (2003) in different aspects. First of all, because the heterogeneity
that we consider arises from a different source, that is from different tastes in the consumption
of goods, and not from different reactions to regional differences. Secondly, because it does not
arise within the same category of mobile skilled workers, but between the two different categories
of skilled and unskilled workers.
The remaining part of the work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a simple
modification in the linear model of economic geography proposed by Ottaviano et al. (2002) by
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allowing preference differences between skilled and unskilled workers.3 Section 3 shows that
the introduction of this assumption may affect the results of the interplay of agglomeration and
dispersion forces in determining the equilibrium outcomes, and Section 4 more deeply discusses the
preference and competition effects on prices determined by changes in the localization of workers
and firms, underlining that the heterogeneity in preferences we introduce may be responsible for
the emergence of stable asymmetric equilibria. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model with heterogeneous preferences
We consider a model with two regions, indexed with r and s, endowed with two factors/workers,
which are distinguished between skilled interregionally mobile workers, indexed with H, and un-
skilled interregionally immobile workers, indexed with L. The total number of skilled workers is
H, while each region is endowed with L/2 unskilled workers. Workers consume M varieties of a
modern manufactured good, with each variety denoted by suffix i and consumed in the quantity
qi, and the quantity q0 of a traditional good (the numeraire of the model). Moreover, workers’
preferences are represented by the following quadratic utility function:
U(q0; qi, i ∈ [0,M ]) = αj
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with j = H,L, αj > 0 and βj > δj > 0.
The total number (mass) of produced varieties M , is the sum of the nr varieties produced in
region r and the ns varieties produced in region s. Parameters αj , βj and δj describe workers’
preferences. Particularly, parameter αj expresses the intensity of the preference for the differenti-
ated good with respect to the traditional good, and the two parameters βj and δj , with βj > δj ,
express the intensity of the preference of consumers of type j for differentiation in the consump-
tion of the modern good. Hence, for any given value of βj , parameter δj underlines the degree of
3 We choose to work with this model because of its tractability. Moreover, we notice that Tabuchi and Thisse
(2001) also adopt this structure.
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